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certificate of stock, and thus of his only reasonable method of disposing of his property in the open market, should be recompensed
for whatever harm he has suffered through the wrongdoer. Of
course if juries were gifted with a godlike intuition, it might be well
to adopt a rule, allowing the plaintiff damages for the depreciation of
the stock from the time he lost dominion until he regained control
(by the issuance of the new certificate), plus an award for whatever
additional inconvenience he suffered as a result of the defendant's
action. But we are living in a fallible age with jurymen whose opinion as to the pecuniary value of trouble, arising from the same source,
might range from the infinitesimal to the infinite. Thus such a calculation might well work an injustice on either party to the action.
Moreover, in these troublous times of panic markets, it might be
extremely difficult to dispose of the new certificate, whereas at the
time of the conversion it might have been readily sold. In such case
we would be putting the burden on the person harmed rather than on
the wrongdoer. We think the fairer rule is the one adopted by the
courts that he who handles the property of another does so at his peril.
GEORGE

F. L.

HENTZ.

SET-OFF-RIGET OF DEPOSITOR-INDORSER IN INSOLVENT BANK.

The general rule followed by the great weight of authority is
that a depositor of an insolvent bank may set off his deposit therein
against a bona fide indebtedness of his own to the bank.' The fact
that the indebtedness of the depositor to the bank has not yet matured2
at the time of insolvency does not interfere with this right of set-off.
However, the question arises whether a depositor may set off against
a note upon which he is indorser his deposit in an insolvent bank,
where the solvency of the maker is conclusively proven.
That issue was raised in the recent case of Bank of United States
v. Braventan.3 There the defendant, indorser of a note held by the

'Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148 (1892) ; Yardley v.
Clothier, 49 Fed. 337, aff'd, 51 Fed. 506 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1892); Smith v.
Fenton, 43 N. Y. 419 (1871) ; Clute v. Warner, 8 App. Div. 40, 40 N. Y. Supp.
392 (3rd Dept. 1896); Van Wagoner v. Paterson Gas Light Co., 23 N. J. L.
283 (1852); Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 Atl. 369
(1914) ; Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Ore. 597, 209 Pac. 100 (1922).
'Scott v. Armstrong, ibid.; Adams v. Spokane Drug Co., 57 Fed. 888
(E. C. D. Wash., E. D. 1892); Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321,
19 S. E. 371 (1894). In Clute v. Warner, id., the Court said: "that while
the note was not due when the bank became insolvent, and its collection could
not be enforced before maturity, the plaintiff had the right to waive the additional time and elect to have it become due at that time, and to make payment
thereof by applying the amount of his money in the possession of the bank to
such payment."
-259 N. Y. 65, 181 N. E. 50 (1932).

NOTES AND COMMENT
plaintiff bank, was a depositor in said bank. Before maturity of
said note, a receiver was appointed for the plaintiff bank. In an
action on the note by the receiver against the defendant-indorser, the
latter sought to set off the amount of her deposit against the note.
The solvency of the maker and its ability to indemnify and repay to
the defendant any sum that she might be required to pay on account
of her liability as indorser of said note, was conceded. The Appellate
Division 4 unanimously granted defendant's claim for a set-off, rendering judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the note less the
amount of the deposit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, voting
unanimously, reversed the holding of the Appellate Division, and
disallawed the set-off.
If only the rights of the litigants were here involved, justice and
equity would require a set-off to be allowed. But because of the
insolvency of the plaintiff, the rights of the general creditors must be
considered, and equity requires that the assets of the insolvent party
be equally distributed among those general creditors.5 Therefore,
when the indorser can turn to the maker, who is concededly solvent,
and be indemnified for the full unpaid amount on the note, he would,
in effect, be receiving a larger amount of his deposit than other
depositors. It is upon this theory that the Court of Appeals proceeded in disallowing the set-off. The case, therefore, turns on the
question of the solvency of the maker.
The Court below quoted at length and based its ruling entirely
upon the decision of Seabury, J., in Curtis v. Davidson..6 While it is
true that portions of the opinion taken out of their context would
seem to indicate that the indorser is entitled to a set-off regardless of
the maker's solvency, that case only decides that the answer was
sufficient against a demurrer, neither the complaint nor
the answer
7
disclosing whether the maker was solvent or insolvent.
The earliest utterances by the Courts of this state of this principle were by Chancellor Walworth in the Matter of the Receiver of
the Middle DistrictBank.8 The rule was there laid down that "If the
real debtor is unable to pay, and the receiver is compelled to resort to
the endorser who is eventually to be the loser, he has some equitable
claim to offset bills which he had at the time the bank stopped payment. But no such offset should be allowed to an indorser where he
'232 App. Div. 640, 257 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1st Dept. 1931).
'Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 241 N. Y. 418, 150 N. E. 501
(1926).
6215 N. Y. 395, 109 N. E. 481 (1915).
'At p. 398, the Court said: "In order to defeat the indorser's right of setoff it must appear that he has more than a speculative or uncertain chance of
indemnity from the maker. When the indorser seeks * * * to have the indebtedness of the holder to him set off against his obligation to the holder, it may
be that a court of equity would require that he give some satisfactory assurance
that he will not be indemnified by the maker." The Court thus seems to recognize the rule that whether a set-off will be allowed depends upon the solvency
of the maker.
' 1 Paige Chancery Reports 585 (1829).
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is indemnified by the real debtor, or where the latter can be compelled
to pay."
This rule was adopted and followed in Borough Bank of Brooklyn v. Midqueen, 9 wherein the facts were identical to the case under
consideration. The Court in refusing to allow a set-off by the
indorser, said, through Crane, J.: "The insolvency of the, maker is a
prerequisite to offset for the indorser."
The principle as thus laid down has been recognized in other
jurisdictions.' 0 In Knaffle v. Knoxville Banking & Trust Co.," during insolvency proceedings against the defendant bank, the plaintiff,
a surety co-maker of a promissory note payable to the bank, filed a
petition to have her deposit set off in payment of the note The
principal maker of the note was solvent and the petition was therefore denied.
In the case of Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 12 where the
'facts were similar, the Court, following the general rule, held, "An
indorser upon a note before insolvency may, after insolvency, set off
his deposit in a bank against the bank's demands upon him under his
indorsement of the note provided the maker of the note is not able
to pay, and he himself has not been indemnified against loss."
In Edmonson v. Thomasson et aL.,13 the plaintiff brought an
action in equity to set off his deposit against a firm note indorsed by
him as a partner, and discounted by the defendant bank, the proceeds
being placed to the credit of the firm. The Court there held that
upon the insolvency of the defendant and of the firm, he would be
entitled to a set-off, but where he could resort to 1 the
assets of the
4
firm, he would not be entitled to set off his deposit.

A peculiar situation arose in Davis v. IndustrialMfg. Co.15 The
receiver of the insolvent bank brought an action against the maker
'70 Misc. 137, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1034 (1910).
Matter of Garfunkel, 8 F. (2d) 790 (D. C. S. D., N. Y., 1924) ; Bryant
v. Williams, 16 F. (2d) 159 (D. C. E. D., N. C., 1926); Davis v. Industrial
Mfg. Co., stpra note 2; New Farmers' Bank v. Young, 100 Ky. 583, 30 S.W.
10

46 (1897); Edmonson & Reekes v. Thomasson, 112 Va. 326, 71 S. E. 536
(1911); Knaffle v. Knoxville Banking & Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 181, 159 S.W.
838) (1913) ; Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 1; see also Pru-

dential Realty Co. v. Allen, Commissioner of Banks, 241 Mass. 277, 135 N. E.
221 (1922).
Ibid.
Supra note 1.
"Supra note 10.
12

14 A distinction has been recognized in many cases between actions at law
by the receiver of the insolvent bank to enforce the indorser's liability on the

note, and an action by the indorser in equity to procure a set-off. Bryant v.
Williams, supra note 10; Curtis v. Davidson, supra note 6; Hubbs, I., in
Bank of United States v. Braveman (supra note 3) points out that the same
general doctrines on the subject of set-off are followed by both courts of law
and equity. (Duncan v. Lyons, 3 Johns. Ch. 351, 358 (N. Y. 1818) ; see also
Beecher v. Vogt Mfg. Co., 227 N. Y. 468, 125 N. E. 831, 833 (1920)). The
distinction, if any, turns on the burden of proving the solvency or insolvency
of the
maker.note 10.
"Supra
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and eight individuals who had indorsed the note for the accommodation of the maker. Two of these co-sureties sought to set off their
deposits against their liability as indorsers. The Court there held
that if the maker is insolvent and all the co-sureties were solvent,
these depositors could offset one-eighth of their liability with their
deposit in the bank. If any one or more of the indorsers are insolvent, the right of set-off will be allowed only to the proportion that
they are required to pay. 10
The conclusion to be reached from a consideration of these cases
is that this state has fallen in line with the majority of the states in
adopting what we believe to be the more logical and just rule. While
it is true that at first glance a denial of the right of set-off would
seem to work a hardship, a consideration of the facts shows that the
adoption of any view contrary to that of the Court of Appeals would
have that effect. As was said by the Court in Lippitt v. Thanws
Loan & Trust Co., 17 "This rule would seem to be based on
sound reason. The indorser cannot lose if the maker be good, while
if the set-off be allowed, the estate of the insolvent may be diminished for the sole benefit of the debtor. He will thus pay less of his
debt than any other debtor, or the indorser would get a larger percentage of his deposit than other depositors. This result would be
inequitable."
RUBIN BARON.

STATUTE OF LImITATIONS-PLEADING BY NON-RESIDENT.

By the Statute 4 and 5 Anne (1705) c. 16, if at the date of
the accrual of the action, the person liable to be sued is absent,
"beyond the seas," the period of limitation does not begin to run
in favor of such person until his return into the realm.' That
statute was construed "to include both residents and non-residents,
subjects and foreigners alike." 2 Practically all of the states of the
United States have adopted that statute in some form, and have,
"Of course, where the note is made for the accommodation of one who

appears thereon as indorser, and the bank discounts the same and credits the
proceeds to his account with knowledge of its accommodation character, the

indorser in such cases, not having any recourse to the maker, a set-off will be
allowed, for any question of an inequitable preference does not then arise.

Building & Engineering Co. v. Northern Bank, 206 N. Y. 400, 99 N. E. 1044
(1912).
"Supra note 1.

'3 STEPHENS, CO-Mm. ON LAws OF ENGLAND

(18th ed. 1925) p. 481.

' Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 263, 267 (N. Y. 1808); Mason, Chapin &

Co. v. Union Mills Paper Mfg. Co., 81 Md. 446, 32 Atl. 311 (1895).

